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What Makes a Utopia Inconvenient? On the Advantages and
Disadvantages of a Realist Orientation to Politics
BENJAMIN L. MCKEAN Ohio State University
Contemporary politics is often said to lack utopias. For prevailing understandings of the practicalforce of political theory, this looks like cause for celebration. As blueprints to apply to politicalpractice, utopias invariably seem too strong or too weak. Through an immanent critique of
political realism, I argue that utopian thought, and political theory generally, is better conceived as
supplying an orientation to politics. Realists including Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss explain
how utopian programs like universal human rights poorly orient their adherents to politics, but the realists
wrongly conclude that utopias and other ideal theories necessarily disorient us. As I show through an
analysis of utopian claims made by Michel Foucault, Malcolm X, and John Rawls, utopias today can
effectively disrupt entrenched forms of legitimation, foster new forms of political identity, and reveal new
possibilities within existing institutions. Utopias are needed to understand the political choices we face
today.
What is the political force of utopian think-ing? 25 years after the end of the SovietUnion, many answers to this question still
seemmarked by the experience of the ColdWar.When
taking that experience as exemplary, political estima-
tions of utopia tend to oscillate between two extremes.
Many worry that utopian thinking can swamp politics
when it provides a radical social blueprint and inspires
adherents to implement it mechanically (Kateb 1972).
On the other hand, utopian thinking that fails to resem-
ble a radical blueprint is dismissed as toothless, either
because it cannot be applied to practical politics or be-
cause it all too closely resembles politics as it already
is (Shklar 1998). Consequently, utopia is understood
to have either too much or too little political force
and so new replacement utopias—especially “The Last
Utopia” of human rights—are invariably found want-
ing (Moyn 2010).
Perhaps as a result, the past decade has seen the
Q1
striking rise of a realism that scorns utopian blueprints
alongside attempts to decouple Marxism from the end
of the Soviet Union in order to recuperate “The Idea of
Communism” (Dsouzinas and Zizek 2010). In this ar-
ticle, I argue that a profound misunderstanding of how
political theory can relate to political practice lies be-
hind this prolonged crisis of utopianism.Contemporary
political realism offers an important critique of utopian
thinking that shows why attempts to apply it appear
too strong or weak; however, rather than dismissing
or marginalizing utopianism, as the realists themselves
do, I show how their critique can illuminate its genuine
utility. When one abandons the expectation that the
political force of utopias must manifest itself through
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attempts at application and instead considers how they
can orient political actors to existing institutions, one
can see utopian thinking making effective interven-
tions by disrupting entrenched forms of legitimation,
fostering new forms of identity, and revealing new po-
tentials within existing institutional forms. These are
important political and theoretical possibilities and we
have good reason to value their liberatory potential on
realist grounds.
Utopias take many forms, but for purposes of this
argument, I will use utopian thinking to refer to depic-
tions of or reflections on highly desirable and hoped-
for social and political circumstances that include no
necessary reference to the means, costs, or feasibility
of achieving them from our present condition. Utopian
thinking does not need to imagine a perfect society—
historically, it rarely does (Sargent 2010, 104)—but can,
for example, envision worlds in which some contempo-
rary problems are simply absent without proposing a
plan for bringing that about. The charge that utopian Q2
thinking fails to engage appropriately with the practice
of actual politics is a very old complaint—it is aimed
at Socrates throughout Plato’sRepublic—but works by
Raymond Geuss and BernardWilliams published over
the past decade have given it new life by suggesting
that the need for realism is especially timely in light of
the contemporary search for new replacement utopias.1
It is a measure of the influence of this critique that
many old thinkers are now returning to prominence
under the realist banner, their ideas freshly re-certified
as practical and nonutopian (Ciccariello-Maher 2014;
Mantena 2012). Political realists have unsurprisingly
raised a variety of concerns about utopias, but the
complaint that I consider here is that utopian think-
ing fails to orient us to our actual circumstances and
problems. As I will use the term, an orientation to
politics concerns how we get our bearings in our so-
cial world by identifying those features we habitually
1 For overviews of this resurgence in realism, see Galston (2010) and
Rossi and Sleat (2014). For a survey of its intellectual roots in the
work of Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin, among others, see Jacoby
(2005).
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regard as the most salient parts of the landscape and
which we are consequently disposed to weigh in our
considered judgment about what to do.2 Geuss and
Williams argue that utopian thinking is constitutively
unable to orient people properly to politics because
of its theoretical methodology, which determines what
is desirable or valuable without any reference to the
particular political choices faced by really existing ac-
tors. For example, theorizing a world in which human
rights are universally respected doesn’t seem to make
it easier to cope with a world in which the content of
human rights is the subject of deep disagreement and in
which the selective enforcement of human rights is used
to advance national interests. Against thinking that is
fundamentally unworldly and encouraging of illusions,
Geuss and Williams suggest that we should be attuned
above all to how people actually are and how politics
really works so that we can be better oriented and take
more effective political action. To the extent that they
accord utopian thinking any beneficial practical role, it
is as a source of motivation for engaging in politics, but
never guiding how to do so.
Geuss andWilliams have importantly different views
in many respects, including about politics, but their
work is united in polemically suggesting that the
most important distinction in contemporary political
thought and practice is between realists and others.
In the profusion of secondary literature responding to
Geuss and Williams and carrying their work forward,
surprisingly few have asked how should their realism
be evaluated on its own terms—that is, not only as a
theoretical view but also as a political intervention? I
will argue that the resultant orientation to politics is
unnecessarily limited. Importantly, my argument dif-
fers from defenses of utopian thinking which take im-
practical political thought as a worthwhile end in it-
self (e.g., Estlund 2011). Using human rights as a case
study, I show how realist critiques have obscured the
emancipatory potential of regarding them as a utopian
project. Political projects advancing human rights are
not necessarily utopian, but imagining a world in which
“the dignity of each individual will enjoy secure in-
ternational protection” through the realization of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is
surely what historian and human rights critic Samuel
Moyn calls “a recognizably utopian program” (Moyn
2010, 1).
Against the assumption—shared byGeuss,Williams,
and Moyn alike—that the adherents of such utopian
visions understand them as blueprints to be applied
in practice, I argue that envisioning an ideal society
need not be a precursor to attempts to build it. Rather,
as I show by analyzing the uses of human rights by
Malcolm X and Michel Foucault, utopian thinking can
orient us to existing political institutions in ways that
both track the operations of power and attend to real
2 This concept of orientation has important roots in Immanuel Kant
but the conception used here is sufficiently general so that it is ap-
plicable to and used by non-Kantians and anti-Kantians. For Kant’s
view, see Kant (1991). For the use of orientation specifically by anti-
Kantians, see Hutchings (2011).
opportunities for resistance. Through a counterintu-
itive reading of John Rawls’s account of orientation,
I argue that even an impossible-to-realize ideal the-
ory can help us understand important features of our
present circumstances. In short, a realism that seeks to
facilitate effective political action should recognize its
own interdependence with utopian thinking. Realism
usefully highlights the cost of every political choice,
but often overlooks the costs associated with adopting
realism itself; an insistence on seeing things as they
are can easily curdle into an insistence that things are
as they must be, especially because new political pos-
sibilities are both risky and difficult to perceive. It is
here that utopias retain their political force. No longer
understood simply as blueprints for action or princi-
ples to be applied mechanically, utopias can give us
a novel perspective on our own politics valuable on
realist grounds.
THE POLITICS OF PRIORITIZING IDEAL
THEORY
The project of defending utopian thinking on realist
grounds may seem quixotic in light of what many take
to be their obvious opposition. For example, William
Galston begins his explanation of political realism with
what he calls “the least surprising point—namely, real-
ism’s resolutely antiutopian stance” (Galston 2010, 394;
see also Jubb 2015, 920). However, others perceive a
more complicated relation; Enzo Rossi and Matt Sleat
contend that “conceptually, nothing precludes realists
from resurrecting the 1968 slogan ‘Be realistic. De-
mand the impossible’” (Rossi and Sleat 2014, 690),
even if few have actually done so in practice. Conse-
quently, it is important to be specific about the partic-
ular realist objection to utopian thinking that I want to
consider. In contrast to the tradition of thinking about
politics that sees theorizing as pursuing truths that are
essentially separate from political action, a realist ap-
proach focuses on how theories are lived now, as they
shape ways of seeing the existing political world by
drawing our attention to particular features of it. That
habitual attention naturally leads political agents to act
in particular ways, as some actions appear appropriate
to the perceived environment while others become al-
most unthinkable. As Geuss puts it, “My interest is
in the practical coherence of a certain general frame-
work for orienting political action in the contemporary
world” (Geuss 2001a, vii; hereafter, “HIP”). One of the Q3
strengths of this view is that a framework for orienta-
tion can draw frommany different resources, including
not only political theory but also other practices, like
human rights, that shape our expectations of politics.
Thus, for realists, the key question of political theory is
not “what would an ideal society look like?” Rather,
they ask, “what kind of political thinking will orient
people most coherently and effectively to intervene in
politics?” For Geuss, the answer is clear:
. . . political philosophy must be realist. That means,
roughly speaking, that it must start from and be concerned
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in the first instance not with how people ought ideally
(or ought ‘rationally’) to act, what they ought to desire,
or value, the kind of people they ought to be, etc., but,
rather, with the way the social, economic, political, etc.,
institutions actually operate in some society at some given
time, and what really does move human beings to act in
given circumstances. (2008, 9; hereafter, “PRP”)
Rather than putting ideals first, Geuss wants to put the
facts first (bracketing for now the question of where
exactly ideals go). Political actors that fail to do this—
whether they draw those ideals from political theory
or theUDHR—will almost certainly not promote their
intended ends since they will habitually overlook the
most important features of their circumstances. In this
section, I consider Geuss’s account of utopian thinking
in political theory as a source of disorientation before
turning to the role of utopian thinking in the political
project of human rights next.
Geuss offered a particularly vivid symbol of his cri-
tique with the holiday card that he reportedly sent in
2004 juxtaposing portraits of Immanuel Kant and John
Rawls with images of George W. Bush and prisoner
abuse at Abu Ghraib (Worsnip 2013). Understanding
how and why Geuss connects these philosophers to
actions that they would plainly deplore will clarify the
nature and limits of his analysis of utopian thinking’s
relation to orientation.3 In order to motivate action af-
ter the horrors of Holocaust, Rawls constructs a “real-
istic utopia” in which justice is fully realized “someday,
somewhere” (Rawls 2001b, 127). But Geuss dismisses
this consoling vision.4 In 2003, he asked rhetorically
about Rawls, “Are reflections about the correct distri-
bution of goods and service in a ‘well-ordered society’
the right kind of intellectual response to slavery, tor-
ture, and mass murder?” (Geuss 2005, 31) To think
about a utopia free of unjustifiable inequality is to miss
the most pressing political problems that have to be
faced now and, to that extent, may even be complicit in
their perpetuation. Who needs utopia when you can’t
even prevent a catastrophe?
It may seem obvious that theorizing an ideal future
would not orient its adherents to pressing contempo-
rary problems, but Geuss’s point is not merely that the
utopian ambitions of egalitarian liberals distract them
from preventing disaster, in the mode of Judith Shk-
lar’s “liberalism of fear” (Shklar 1998). Rather, Geuss
argues that their understanding of the relationship be-
tween political thinking and political action disposes
them to disorientation because of the conception of
normativity they employ. Geuss refers to these alterna-
tives to realism as “ethics-first” thinking, writing, “[t]he
view I am rejecting assumes that one can complete the
work of ethics first, attaining an ideal theory of how
we should act, and then in a second step, one can apply
that ideal theory to the action of political agents” (PRP,
8). Geuss believes that these two features necessarily
go together:
3 See also the discussion of the effect of intentional juxtaposition in
Geuss (2014, 231–6).
4 For Rawls’s defense of realistic utopia as a response to Auschwitz,
see Rawls (2001b, 11–2 and 19–23).
(i) Normative Priority: employing normative values
whose relevance and importance are determined
without any reference to the particular problems
the thinker encounters in politics.
(ii) Politics asApplication: understanding political prac-
tice as the application of a theory developed inde-
pendently of engagement with politics itself.
On this view, the only possible use of a utopian vision
whose normative desirability purports to transcend its
circumstances is to serve as a blueprint for realizing that
vision. While I will argue later that these two steps are
in fact separable, Geuss is right that some of the most
prominent contemporary forms of political theorizing
conjoin both features to troubling effect.
In particular, many practitioners of ideal theory do
produce “realistic utopias” that they take as blueprints,
conceiving of political practice as an attempt to ap-
proximate an ideal theory of just social institutions.
For those who engage in ideal theory as blueprint, nor-
mative priority is given to the envisioned future and
present actions are oriented around it; if a present polit-
ical opportunity appears incompatible with the utopian
future, then that is all one needs to know in order to
reject it. As A. John Simmons writes, “We, as theorists
of justice, simply should not care which policies are
politically possible (etcetera) unless those policies are
also on an acceptable path to a just institutional struc-
ture” (2010, 34). Yet despite being identified as the
aim of political practice, the desirability of the ideal fu-
ture is determined without any reference to the means
or costs of achieving of it; Thomas Pogge articulates
the methodology of many such political philosophers
when he makes a sharp distinction between the project
of constructing an ideal theory and the challenges of
realizing that vision, writing, “I say little about tran-
sition problems: about how the ideal society can be
reached from where we are now, and what demands
justice imposes on the transition” (2007, page x). Tragic
choices among constrained options have no obvious
role to play in the view. Despite this, political action
today can be guided directly by a utopian future be-
cause it is there that the normative values that one
should promote today are worked out. For example, in
his theory of global justice, Luis Cabrera writes, “My
claim is that, with a defensible set of global institutions
in mind—one which plausibly would secure the rights
of all persons—we can extrapolate duties that would
apply in the present global system, including ones to
move institutions closer to the target” (2010, 67). If I
want to figure out what to do within the present global
system, I look first of all to an envisioned future and
only then to existing institutions.
For ideal theory as blueprint, existing politics ap-
pears primarily as imposing obstacles to achieving an
ideal rather than as a realm with its own dynamics
to be respected. Existing political institutions are ac-
cordingly either overlooked entirely or understood
as having an a priori relation to the values that the
view promotes. Such theories thereby offer idealized
pictures of institutions where their flaws appear as
correctable deviations from a conceptual model; in
3
What Makes a Utopia Inconvenient? November 2016
contrast, a realist analysis begins by observing the op-
erations of power and thus bases its interpretation of
existing institutions on their actual functioning. A key
example here is the state. Consider Kant’s conception
of rights and justice, which Geuss provocatively links
with Abu Ghraib. In his political writings, Kant argues
that the rational statemakes justice possible bymaking
rights stable and enforceable in the world. Kant further
argues that, because having a state enforce one’s rights
is a practical precondition to being able to enjoy those
rights, the state’s action through the rule of law cannot
be an infringement on my rights and freedom so long
as it is enforced equally and in good faith.5
On this interpretation, Kant uses an a priori argu-
ment to establish the universal rationality of the state,
an actually existing institution in the world. This has
significant effects on any resultant orientation to pol-
itics, making the state appear as a fixed point rather
than a historically contingent development. We seem
to already know in advance a state’s most important
features without having to inspect it. Geuss is rightly
concerned about the effects of this since it tends to
obscure the actual workings of power and to misunder-
stand the choices in front of us. This also has the status-
quo-preserving effect of making it easy to justify states’
existence and (often dubious) actions. So, while it may
be hyperbolic to link Kant with the abuses of Abu
Ghraib, it is plausible for Geuss to argue that Kant’s
view orients him to politics in a way that presumptively
legitimizes state violence and directs attention away
from the costs of creating and maintaining order. Any
utopian thinking that reduces politics to a venue for the
unmediated application of a priori normative values
risk doing the same.
Geuss’s critique illuminateswhy utopian thinking to-
day appears too strong and too weak when we consider
implementing it. On one hand, utopian thinking is too
ambitious in describing an ideal without any attention
to the means to realize it; to attend in the first instance
to the features of an ideal future disposes the visionary
to acts ill-suited to his surroundings.On the other hand,
utopian thinking is not ambitious enough because the
ideals described too closely resemble the world as it
already is (Geuss 2010a, 429). While the values and
ideals they hold up are meant to have been developed
without any necessary reference to our contingent cir-
cumstances, “[u]topian thinking assumes that we have
too much cognitive ability to detach ourselves from
the world we actually live in, to ‘jump over our own
shadow’ as Hegel put it” and, as a result, “[turns] out
to have the same basic defects of the present, merely
magnified” (Geuss 2015, 155). The visions of just so-
cieties produced by contemporary egalitarian liber-
als have the same methodological problems as Kant’s
conception of the state; attempting to develop ideal
theories of just institutions without first understand-
ing the way real institutions operate produces utopias
that, at best, do nothing to address real defects and,
at worst, mistake existing flaws for fixed points of the
5 See Ripstein 2009 for a recent defense of this argument.
social world. Utopian thinking thus fails to provide
an appropriate orientation to politics twice over—first,
because it misidentifies the most salient features of a
situation; second, because it leads the utopian thinker
to misunderstand the character of his own agency and
ideals.
UTOPIAN THINKING IN POLITICAL
PRACTICE
For Geuss, ideal theory as blueprint represents the
problemwith utopian thinking in political theory, but it
is human rights that exemplifies the pitfalls of utopian
thinking in political practice. Though most human
rights advocates do not have fully articulated philo-
sophical methods and see themselves as responding
directly to urgent crises, Geuss argues that they nev-
ertheless advance ethics-first views. Advocates misun-
derstand how rights function in the world because, in
order to make rights inviolable and urgent, they have
given those rights a normative status that cannot be
affected by empirical developments.6 On Geuss’s view,
the very idea of right requires that ethics “come first”;
rights are meant to be respected in every circumstance,
rendering the specifics of the situation of secondary
importance. The practical failure to respect a human
right does not undermine the normativity of the right;
on the contrary, it only makes it more important to
claim the right, often with perverse effects.
Geuss highlights three specific ways that the ethics-
first orientation provided by a human rights framework
ignores important features of politics and thereby fa-
cilitates ineffective action. First, the utopian vision of
a world where everyone’s human rights are protected
is premised on denying the fact that political action
always has a cost. How would conflicts among the
rights enumerated there be resolved? Can such a world
be achieved without violating human rights along the
way? Do we have enough resources for everyone to
enjoy the right to “periodic holidays with pay” asserted
in Article 24 of UDHR? Geuss argues that there are
no good answers to these questions because human
rights are an “inconvenient fiction” that relies on “a
fantastically optimistic view about God, the world, nat-
ural resources, and the avoidability of conflict” (HIP,
149). Geuss sees those who reject realism as wanting
to have it all and asserts instead that “[p]olitics as we
know it is a matter of differential choice: opting for A
rather than B” and doing so at an advantageous time
(PRP, 30, emphasis original). Lacking an orientation to
the dichotomous nature of political choices, advocates
are disposed to intervene in politics in ways dictated
by their normative ideal rather than by evaluating the
costs of competing options. In the face of a brutal dic-
tator abroad, advocates are likely to say, “We have to
do something!” because they assume that there must
be something we can do when rights are violated. As
a result of their utopian ideal, they are oriented to the
6 Geuss assumes they all see human rights as natural rights, though
that is false. The best argument against understanding human rights
as natural rights is found in Beitz (2009).
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situation in a way that leads them away from consider-
ing the possibility that the costs of “doing something”
may be higher than the costs of doing nothing.
Second, Geuss thinks that the ethics-first nature of
an orientation to human rights ensures that advocates
overlook power and have an incoherent relation to
institutions and enforcement. Since the UDHR has
no institution charged with its implementation, Geuss
dismisses human rights as “no more than a moralizing
conception about what would be desirable without any
concrete specification of an enforcing agency” (HIP,
142). Instead, enforcement is left to states, which is
foolish at best when we know that states overrule
human rights all the time when it is convenient for
their purposes (HIP, 148). Insisting that human rights
be protected by states only gives them a further tool
to legitimate their violence and, since states are the
primary violators as well as the primary protectors of
rights, Geuss thinks that this problem is insoluble. The
disjuncture between how rights operate in our world,
where powerful actors use them to advance their ends,
and how they would operate in a utopia, where ev-
eryone’s rights would be protected by impartial global
mechanisms, is symptomatic of the way ethics-first ori-
entations dispose people to overlook the centrality of
power in politics.
Third, human rights doctrine orients its adherents
to mistake their own character as political agents. In
a recent interview, Geuss said, “To give priority to
claiming rights gives us the completely wrong attitude
toward ourselves, other political agencies and the state
because it basically prioritizes us as passive clients of
the nanny-state” (2013, 93). Human rights orient us to
politics in a way that emphasizes the agency of states
and the passivity of individuals without any tools for
thinking about other forms of political organization
or action since they lack a priori normative status. By
taking individuals as the primary object of concern, the
human rights framework relies on a “tacit (and utterly
implausible form of) atomistic individualism” (2013,
93) that leads to ineffective political mobilization and
facilitates state control. Demanding human rights en-
tails understanding injustice as primarily a wrong done
to individuals, which disposes people to respond as soli-
tary victims.
In short, like egalitarian liberal ideal theories, the
human rights utopia articulated by the UDHR and its
proponents describes a desirable world without any
reference to the means for its achievement while its
hodgepodge of goals seem to aim simultaneously too
high and too low.A right to holidayswith paymay seem
not merely unrealistic but irrelevant in a world where
a billion people live on a dollar a day. At the same
time, even global protection of the rights in the UDHR
would fall short of a genuine utopia. Observing that the
rise of the human rights movement in recent decades
has accompanied the growth of economic inequality,
SamuelMoyn notes in aGeussian spirit, “even were all
the dreams of international human rights movements
to be fulfilled, it is as much low ambitions as failures
to realize them that made human rights companions
of market fundamentalism” (2015, 15). In light of such
problems, Geuss argues that, for anyone properly ori-
ented to contemporary politics, the “last utopia” of
human rights would not appear worth pursuing.
So, does Geuss believe that the point of political
theory is simply to describe what politics is, counsel ac-
ceptance of it, and encourage quiescence? It can sound
like this, aswhenGeuss calls his view “basicallyHobbe-
sian” (PRP, 22). But this is too simple. His realism
chastens our normative ambitions by warning us away
from utopian aspirations that take stability for granted
or rest on an impossible agreement about values. As
a consequence of this turn to the possible, his realism
also chastens our methodological ambitions by exhort-
ing us to remain close to the actual effects of power in
our analysis, since such knowledge will be more useful
for addressing the political choices we face. But Geuss
imagines these Hobbesian requirements on theorizing
to have liberatory potential: “Suppose now we decided
to abandon the narrow limitations imposed on us by
traditional ideas of what a ‘philosophical ethics’ could
(and must) be. Then one could imagine ways of ori-
enting ourselves in the world which went beyond the
sorts of things envisaged and discussed in traditional
forms of ethics” (2014, 192). Geuss sees realism not as
an irksome constraint on the kinds of political theories
we should offer, but as making possible a better kind
of thinking and acting; one who adopts realism has
simply been freed from illusory and impossible desires.
We may not be able to achieve utopia, but perhaps,
once we have left it behind, we will be able to see new
possibilities that are good in their own ways.
REALISM AS A GUIDE TO ACTION?
Geuss makes a persuasive case that, in some impor-
tant instances, utopian thinking orients its adherents to
politics in a way that leads to incoherent, ineffective ac-
tion. But Geuss’s critique also raises difficult issues for
his own alternative approach. Recall that he identifies
ethics-first thinking as having two steps, first identi-
fying a normative value and then applying it without
attending to someessential features of politics. Because
he sees the second step necessarily following from the
first, Geuss suggests that the root of the problem with
how ethics-first thinking guides political action is its
conception of normative values. But does realism offer
an alternative means of judging what to do?
Realists who accept Geuss’s critique have essentially
three paths to choose from: (1) realism could simply
serve as a corrective for other views; (2) realism could
guide action without providing normative evaluations;
or (3) realism could provide its own conception of
normative evaluation. If political realism is content to
be merely a corrective, then it can let the other views
supply the normative values and suggest either that the
means to pursue those ends are unrealistic or that the
values cannot be fully realized. On this reading, human
rights doctrine is inconvenient by its own lights; realism Q4
does not offer a substantive or methodological alter-
native so much as it acts a permanent gadfly, assessing
the coherence of other positions without offering any
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distinctive values of its own. A realism of this kind is
an ethos or what Mark Philp calls “more like a code of
honor . . . [than] a set of metatheoretical claims” (2012,
637). A realism that refuses to be action-guiding could
still be prescriptive in the sense that it counsels a
clear-eyed confrontation with reality without having
anything to say about what happens after that con-
frontation. This ethos typically narrates its bearer as
a kind of tragic hero, one both freed by knowing the
truth but also cursed to bear the opprobrium of those
whose illusions he shatters. In these moods, Geuss also
identifies his position with Theodor Adorno’s; some
circumstances require taking up a “merely negative”
attitude without providing any reason to think shat-
tered illusions can be replaced (2005, 9).
Yet Geuss often makes stronger claims for realism
and suggests that it can facilitate better, more effec-
tive political action on its own. In places, he even sug-
gests that realism should lead directly to some quite
particular courses of action, such as “[fostering] fur-
ther European integration” (2010a, 28). But how does
one judge possible political actions without appealing
to some values that they would promote? Sometimes
Geuss suggests that once one adopts his perspective,
its virtues will become evident (PRP, 17). That would
be a doubly optimistic kind of realism, since it implies
both an epistemic optimism that we have a reasonably
reliable access to reality and a practical optimism that
changing the way we talk about that reality will make
things go better (Honig and Stears 2011). Such opti-
mism runs counter to Geuss’s own insistence on the
persistence of disagreement. Even those who adopt a
realist orientation topoliticswill surely offer competing
interpretations of events, discern different possibilities
for action, and seek to promote diverse ends. Geuss
erases this pluralism when he conflates orientation and
normative evaluation. While adopting political realism
may suffice to rule out certain actions as self-defeating,
it is rarely enough to defend the affirmative choice of
a particular action.
If Geuss wants to offer a free-standing approach to
political thinking (and it is not always clear that he
does), then such a realism needs to be able to make ex-
plicit the value of the actions that it promotes. Consider
thepressing political questionof how theEUand its cit-
izens should relate to a country abusing human rights.
Geuss asserts that the EU should embrace China “in
the interest of collaboration on the long-term goal of
demilitarizing international politics” (2010a, 29). This
is surely a worthy goal, but if political action should
promote this aim, how does realism really differ from
utopian thinking? Geuss acknowledges that “[i]t is a
value judgment of a kind to think that a world in which
the use of extreme military force is routine is, other
things being equal, less good than one in which the
use of force is uncommon” (2010a, 30). Geuss seeks to
make his judgment more limited than the human rights
advocate’s by introducing a comparative element; he
does not suggest, for example, that making military
force uncommon is the sole end of politics and that all
actions failing to promote this end are thereby imper-
missible. But the insufficiency of Geuss’s conception of
normative values is made clear by the phrase “other
things being equal.” If the EU were to abandon its
alliance with the US to become closer to China, other
things would not remain equal. In deciding to do so,
the EU would surely need to make a judgment about
how to weigh the other values at stake; concerns for
the environment, prosperity, free speech, and stability
may all pull in different directions. But becauseGeuss’s
criticism of utopian thinking assumes that prioritizing
particular normative values leads directly to an orien-
tation to politics as an application of those values, he
minimizes his own reliance on normative values and
does not address how to weigh them.
Rejecting an implausibly univocal realism thus puts
Geuss in a bind: if he is to be entitled to the substan-
tive political claims he wants to make (no to human
rights, yes to an EU-China alliance), Geuss must reject
his own methodological criticism of utopian thinking.
Alternatively, he could rest content as a gadfly or, more
dramatically, renounce the claim to facilitate better ac-
tions and say that a truly realist orientation reveals all
our political actions to be equally meaningless. Geuss
has oscillated among these positions, moving from an
almost nihilistic despair to a measured appreciation of
utopian thinking and back again. In the former vein,
Geuss memorably stated that “[w]e are not, of course,
now in a situation in which it is realistically possible for
us to envisage any fundamental change in our world
which we could ourselves bring about by our own ef-
forts” (2014, 194). This politics of futility really does
suggest that our actions do not much matter and, as
a result, even the value of a clear-eyed confrontation
with reality becomes doubtful.
However, in othermoods, he has written that realism
is not necessarily antiutopian (Geuss 2010b) and has Q5
gone so far as to say that “unless one thinks that we
already live in the best of all possible worlds and that
lack of flexibility in our relation to our own future is a
good thing, giving up our utopian impulses completely
would represent a serious loss” (2015, 158). Shadowed
by the worry that utopian thinking will result in the
reduction of politics to enacting blueprints, Geuss care-
fully refers to “utopian impulses,” the content of which
remains elusive, rather than utopian thinking, which
provides more determinate content.7 Instead of seeing
utopia as a potential aid to orientation, Geuss locates
its practical political function elsewhere as when, in a
discussion of Gustav Landauer, he notes that “utopian
impulses are motivationally essential” (2015, 156). But
this raises the question of what will adherents of utopia
be motivated to do? Without articulating an alterna-
tive practical use for them, those who rely on utopias
to motivate engagement in politics will likely default
7 Jacoby similarly tries to separate a bad “blueprint tradition” of
utopianism from a good “iconoclastic tradition,” which “[refuses] to
map out the future” (2005, 85). Part of the argument of this article is
that it is the critics of utopian thinking, not the utopians themselves,
who are conflating thinking with its application; once we recognize
that the content of utopian thought can be employed as a means
of orientation to existing politics rather than as a blueprint for the
future, much of the attraction of theBilderverbot valorized by Jacoby
and Geuss drops away.
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to applying them as blueprints—precisely what Geuss
wants to avoid. Consequently, we must look elsewhere
for a realist account of the use of utopian thinking that
can supplant the impulse to implement utopia.
WILLIAMS AND POLITICAL NORMATIVITY
If Geuss ends up opening the door for utopian thinking
to play some practical role, how wide should realists
open that door? Bernard Williams suggests that we
need not wholly exclude from politics the normative
values that make utopias desirable; rather, our ori-
entations should simply restrict the range of norma-
tive values we attend to in politics, disposing us to
attend to a similarly restricted set of political visions.
Once again, human rights exemplify the problem with
utopian thinking; against the “unfortunate” profusion
of rights enumerated in theUDHR(2005, 64),Williams
argues that human rights should be sharply limited if
they are to function appropriately in politics. However,
this argument is as self-defeating as Geuss’s. Williams
pursues the third path open to Geuss and argues that
utopian thinking leads to politics as application not be-
cause of the employment of normative value per se, but
rather because utopia colonizes politics with nonpolit-
ical values. However, I will argue that Williams’s view
also crucially relies on such nonpolitical values. This
suggests that realists should abandon the view that poli-
tics as application is attributable to anymethodological
error in ambitious claim-making about normative de-
sirability; there is no relation between the scope of a
utopian vision and people’s propensity to treat it as a
blueprint for politics.
Geuss cites Bernard Williams’s realism as influenc-
ing his own (2005; 2014), so the similarity of their ap-
proaches should be unsurprising. Williams too identi-
fies with Hobbes and writes, “I identify the ‘first’ po-
litical question in Hobbesian terms as the securing of
order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of co-
operation. It is ‘first’ because solving it is the condition
of solving, indeed posing, any others” (2005, 30).While
Williams calls those outside the realist camp “politi-
cal moralists” rather than “ethics-first” thinkers, their
characteristic error once again concerns their concep-
tion of normativity and their number prominently in-
cludes Rawls, understood as the most important repro-
ducer of Kant’s erroneous “application” view (2005).
Where Williams parts ways with Geuss is in offering
a particular conception of desirable order that has
a realist normativity conceived as internal to politics
rather than imported from amorality established apart
from it. Williams locates that normativity in people’s
pervasive concern with legitimacy.Williams introduces
what he calls the Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD),
which “can be equated with there being an ‘acceptable’
solution to the first political question” (2005, 4). The
normative value of an order comes from this genuine
acceptance by those subject to it and so we should
accept great variation in views of what counts as a
good reason to accept order. For example, according
to Williams, inequality of status was quite compati-
ble with legitimacy in medieval Europe, but condi-
tions of modernity are such that people insist upon
some form of equality as part of the BLD. Utopian
thinking that sets higher aims for politics mistakes the
values appropriate to a realm defined by power and
disagreement.
Williams combines this acknowledgement of local
variation in what counts as acceptable with the be-
lief that there are nonetheless limits to what counts
as politics at all. Williams considers a caste society
with a minority group “no better off than enemies of
the state” and which has no reason to see the state
as anything other than sheer coercive force (2005, 5).
Williams notes, “there is nothing to be said to this group
to explain why they shouldn’t revolt” (2005, 5, empha-
sis original) and so theBLD is clearly notmet.Williams
adds one further caveat: “the critical theory principle”
calls for making sure that the structure of domination
does not manipulate people into accepting the status
quo (2005, 14). This principle makes the normativity of
Williams’s conception of order especially clear since it
gives an observer a reason to think the BLD has not
been met even when some of those subject to a state
think otherwise. Williams’s account thus helps us to
see how a realist account could criticize orientations
beyond offering an immanent critique of utopian aspi-
rations.Auseful orientationwould facilitate practically
coherent actions that contribute to order of the right
kind—one freely accepted and legitimate according to
the standards of those subject to it. An “inconvenient”
orientation would fail to recognize that what counts
as legitimate varies from place to place and time to
time. For Williams, the refusal of universal applica-
bility makes the normativity of his view internal to
politics; where attempts to apply utopian thinking see
politics as merely the venue for applying a priori val-
ues, Williams’s realism sees politics as the context from
which values arise.
Despite this, Williams fails at differentiating his re-
alist view of normativity from purportedly moralizing
utopian views; human rights again help illustrate the
problem.Williams writes, “the nearer political thought
gets to action, as in the concrete affirmation of human
rights, themore likely it is to be frivolous if it is utopian”
(2005, 25) and so, against the UDHR, Williams de-
fends a core of human rights against torture, the denial
of religious expression, and other wrongs he regards
as “obvious” (2005, 62). Such rights orient us to the
boundary of politics since they mark when “the sup-
posed solution [to the first political question], political
power, [becomes] part of the problem” (2005, 63) and
therefore can never be accepted as legitimate. But in
addressing two situations of apparent human rights vi-
olations that concern communities with diverging con-
ceptions of legitimacy—women’s rights and humanitar-
ian intervention—Williams’s argument relies on values
from outside politics. These are not marginal cases to
consider and they frequently press practical dilemmas
on us; an orientation that disposes us to overlook them
is fatally incomplete. Williams’s claims may be more
limited than the political moralists he targets, but as
with Geuss, the difference between the views concerns
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the scope of their extrapolitical requirements, not a
difference in their kind.8
Consider the question of whether an egalitarian soci-
ety should consider it a human rights violationwhenan-
other country denies women the right to drive or vote.
Williams writes, “the contemporary world is certainly
within reach of the past, and the influences of the past
include, now, theocratic conceptions of government
and patriarchal ideas of the rights of women. Shouldwe
regard practices elsewhere that still express such con-
ceptions as violations of fundamental human rights?”
(2005, 70) and answers no. He writes, “[t]he charge
that a practice violates fundamental human rights is
ultimate, the most serious of political accusations. In
their most basic form, violations of human rights are
very obvious, and so is what is wrong with them: un-
mediated coercion, might rather than right” (2005, 72).
Williams claims that the oppression of women is gen-
erally not a case of unmediated coercion because both
men and women in theocratic and patriarchal societies
are “jointly caught up in a set of beliefs which regu-
late their lives and are indeed unsound, but which are
shared in ways that move the society further away from
the paradigm of unjust coercion” (2005, 27). Williams
worries that labeling such cases human rights viola-
tions will lead to disastrous interventions as advocates
force norms of gender equity on a society that doesn’t
widely accept them. Since it would be straightforwardly
illegitimate to install a new government to protect my
preferred a priori standards of human rights when its
subjects didnot accept them,Williamsbelieves political
realism leads to a principle of noninterference in such
cases. As he describes it, his view “tells [people] about
certain judgments which they need not make”—that is,
we can safely overlook such possibilities because there
are neither philosophical nor political reasons to act on
them (2005, 68).9
But there are a host of ways that someone who be-
lieves that women’s rights are human rights could act
because of that belief that avoid violating the BLD.
Should egalitarians advocate for government policies
that sanction such theocratic governments? Should
they give money and support to indigenous feminist
groups that are seeking to organize discontent and
resistance? A realist orientation has no reason to di-
rect attention away from these political possibilities.
Williams has two options here: either his realism is
indeterminate about cases where there are competing
standards of legitimacy—which would undermine its
claim to being an adequate source of orientation—or
hemust endorse noninterference on grounds he should
regard as normatively “external” to politics. Williams
8 Bavister-Gould (2013) also argues thatWilliams’s view depends on
universalizing ethical claims, but does so by emphasizing Williams’s
endorsement of the primacy of thick ethical ties. Erman and Mo¨ller
(2015) argue that normative conceptions of legitimacy always rely
on ethics-first reasoning even when the sources of normativity are
exclusively political.
9 Williams’s view here is importantly related to his views about the
nature of reasons, which largely lie outside the scope of this article.
SeeWilliams (1981). For an account relating these views toWilliams’s
political theory, see Flathman (2010).
opts for the latter and suggests that we ought not re-
gard patriarchal oppression of women as one the “cen-
tral core of evils” to which an international response
is appropriate (2005, 74). This value judgment about
the gravity of patriarchal oppression is not entailed by
Williams’s conception of politics, but rather is derived
from normative and empirical considerations external
to it—including a conservative view that counsels the
preservation of existing conceptions of legitimacy until
combating core evils requires some change in them.
In trying to carve out a set of “obvious” human
rights from the broader utopian program of achieving
a world that respects the UDHR, Williams converges
with critics like Moyn, who writes, “preventing catas-
trophe through minimalist ethical norms and building
utopia through maximalist political vision . . . are abso-
lutely different” and suggests that advocates “should
restrict themselves to offering minimal constraints on
responsible politics, not a new form of maximal politics
of their own” (Moyn 2010, 226–7). But there is a cost
to this effort to divorce human rights from utopianism:
interpreting human rights as minimal constraints on
politics implies that violations of those constraints are
a form of domination located outside politics. Williams
notes, “one lot of people terrorizing another lot of peo-
ple is not a political situation” (2005, 63); as a result,
even when the atrocities are perpetrated by govern-
ments on minority groups, he characterizes the resul-
tant suffering as a kind of moral wrong. As Williams
himself notes, this way of characterizing the situation
opens the door to justifications of humanitarian inter-
vention as “an enlightened imperialism” since it identi-
fies the minority group as suffering victims rather than
political agents (2005, 151). In sum, to rule out both
noncoercive efforts to shift standards of legitimacy (as
in his judgment that the oppression of women should
not understood as a human rights violation) and coer-
cion in the name of nonpolitical suffering (if he wishes
to block imperialism), Williams needs some additional
normative premise to support noninterference.But any
such premise would not be internal to politics as he has
construed it.
This problem is telling. In seeking to avoid the ap-
plication of utopian visions to those that do not share
them, these realists have consistently misunderstood
the nature of their own position and its relation to
utopian thinking—that is, they’ve mistaken the poli-
tics of their own intervention. At bottom, their differ-
ences with opponents are not philosophical disagree-
ments about the nature of value; in defending their
preferred policies, both Geuss and Williams make use
of the kind of values they claim to reject. Rather, their
crucial difference from their opponents is a practical
disagreement about what we can do to address con-
temporary political problems. Their constrained sense
of how ideals can be used in politics prevents them from
recognizing the realist grounds for valuing utopian
thinking and, as a result, their realism needlessly cuts
off consideration of some genuine political possibil-
ities, inadvertently supporting the status quo despite
their professedly liberatory intent. To see this, the
next section considers alternative uses of human rights
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that show how utopian claims can avoid politics as
application.
REALIST HUMAN RIGHTS?
A political theory cannot implement itself and the
way a theory is applied may have effects contrary to
what the theory establishes as ideal, as when human
rights are used to legitimize state violence. Geuss and
Williams are right that many practitioners of utopian
thinking fail to account for this. But they are wrong
to assume that application or motivation are the only
practical uses of utopias; exploring the ways that some
utopian uses of human rights can orient their adherents
to present political possibilities can resolve the impasse
that realists face when they claim to distinguish them-
selves based on a distinctive approach to normativity.
None of this undercuts the realist argument that hu-
man rights claims can legitimize dangerous exercises
of state power at home and abroad, in part because
they are seen as outside politics—but it is essential to
note that this perception is carefully cultivated by some
advocates rather than intrinsic to the concept.AsMoyn
notes, “if those who invented the contemporary human
rights culture were utopians, they were Machiavellians
too, devising a strategy that would allow their brand
of transformation to differ from the world as it was
but also from alternative political agendas—often by
strategically denying that their aims were strategic at
all” (2014, 25). Major human rights NGOs continue
to strike this strategically apolitical pose despite the
fact that it leads them to close alliances with human
rights violators like the U.S. government.10 The realists
are right to point out that utopian thinking that posi-
tions itself as above politics can serve oppressive ends.
Yet, as Williams’s approach to humanitarian interven-
tion showed, realists actually exacerbate that danger
by locating rights violations outside politics. A better
response on realist grounds is to emphasize the polit-
ical status of human rights claims so that they can be
seen as contestable articulations of particular demands.
Indeed, many advocates make use of human rights in
precisely this way; instead of expressing a longing to
transcend politics, human rights claims are often better
understood as political claims against prevailing views
of legitimacy and the orientations that support them.
To illustrate this possibility, I turn to two perhaps
unlikely utopians: Michel Foucault and Malcolm X.
Where the ideal theorist imagines a world in which
everyone fully complies with the requirements of jus-
tice (Simmons 2010, 3–5), these thinkers of what might
be called oppositional utopias envision desirable but
impracticable responses to existing injustices; in par-
ticular, by using human rights to imagine an impossible
unity of the powerless that momentarily erases their
internal political differences, they produce an orien-
tation to politics that perceives important possibilities
that would otherwise be overlooked. It is important not
10 For a recent defense of this strategy by the executive director of
Human Rights Watch, see Roth (2014).
to exaggerate the differences between ideal and oppo-
sitional utopias, however, since one can also engage in
ideal theorizing that is appropriately oriented to real
problems, as I argue in the next section. My point here
is to show that avowedly utopian uses of human rights
can contribute to an effective orientation to politics
and so realists need not restrict them to a minimum
core of claims or dismiss them entirely.
While it may surprise to turn to him here, Foucault
argued explicitly that utopias can draw our attention
to political possibilities in our own world, avowing his
interest in the “actually realized utopias in which . . . all
the other real emplacements that can be found
within the culture are, at the same time, represented,
contested, and reversed” (1998, 178). The kinds of
utopias that interest Foucault are those that exist in
some form within our world, but which also point be-
yond and contradict it. Two primary forms of utopia
recur throughout his work: first, “the profoundly and
originally utopian experience of the body” (Foucault
2006, 233); second, revolts and uprisings—what he de-
scribes as “the possibility of this moment where life
cannot be exchanged, where power becomes power-
less, and where, in front of the gallows and themachine
guns, men rise up” (Afary and Anderson 2005, 264). I
focus on the latter—ways of imagining the surprising
reversal of power relations through collective action.
We can see what makes this utopian in Foucault’s sense
by turning briefly to his reporting on the Iranian rev-
olution. Asking Iranians what they wanted in 1978,
Foucault reports their replies: “‘A utopia,’ some told
mewithout any pejorative implication. ‘An ideal,’ most
of them said to me. At any rate, it is something very old
and also very far into the future” (Afary and Ander-
son 2005, 206). For Foucault, revolt is utopian because
uprisings have always happened but also point beyond
themselves to a world in which the collective sense of
possibility and unity of that moment impossibly con-
tinues beyond the revolt itself. Of course, such utopian
visions can themselves become oppressive when taken
up by the powerful, as the actual Iranian revolution
vividly illustrated, but to imagine otherwise would be
to endorse precisely a blueprint for ending politics en-
tirely. Such “unmasking” of utopia or human rights as
dangerously enmeshed in power relations could never
serve to discredit them entirely to Foucault, though,
since he believes that no discourse takes place outside
of power relations (Patton 2004).
Nevertheless, this acknowledgement of the danger-
ous power of utopian thinking can help us to under-
stand what Ben Golder aptly calls Foucault’s “critical
affirmation of rights discourse” (Golder 2011, 286). Q6
Foucault sees human rights as utopian precisely be-
cause they are embedded in our politics, but also point
beyond it and can contest it; indeed, he even sees a
human rights framework as helping us to orient us to
the possibility of a global revolt. Consider his 1981
remarks at a press conference to promote an effort to
defend Vietnamese boat people (available in Keenan
1987, 20–1). Speaking on behalf of “a certain shared
difficulty in accepting what is happening,” Foucault as-
serts the existence of “an international citizenry, which
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has its rights, which has its duties, and which promises
to raise itself up against every abuse of power, no mat-
ter who the author or the victim.” Foucault here uses
rights talk to an eminently political end without mak-
ing any claims to a prepolitical or a priori foundation
and without legitimizing state action. On the contrary,
the rights of this international citizenry come precisely
from a clear-eyed assessment of real political institu-
tions, as he avows when he says, “People’s misfortune
must never be a silent remainder of politics. It founds
an absolute right to rise up and to address those who
hold power.” Unlike Williams’s account of suffering
as a moral wrong, Foucault avoids the trap of making
those whose rights have been violated into victims in
need of an enlightened imperial rescue. Instead, Fou-
cault makes it clear that his own speech is political and
interested, saying “After all, we are all governed and,
to that extent, in solidarity.”
Foucault’s comments illustrate the potential for real-
ist paths that Geuss and Williams miss. To speak of an
international citizenry that takes direct action “against
every abuse of power, no matter who the author or
the victim” is a characteristic utopian hope insofar as
it is both desirable and impracticable that everyone do
what they ought to. But Foucault is not best under-
stood as setting out a plan based on a priori principles
or suggesting that we try to implement this utopian
vision while ignoring possible political actions that are
not on the path to its realization. Nor does Foucault’s
invocation of human rights constitute a repudiation of
his earlier radical insights about power or a neolib-
eral turn that settles for the adequacy of traditional
rights as a defense against domination, as some have
argued (Paras 2006). Rather, Foucault asserts the rights
of international citizenry as a response to the failure
of institutions that ground their own legitimacy in a
monopoly on rights protection. As Foucault explained
in lectures given at the Colle`ge de France in January
1976, his analysis typically aims “to understand power
in its most regional forms and institutions, and espe-
cially at the points where this power transgresses the
rules of right that organize and delineate it, oversteps
those rules and is invested in institutions, is embod-
ied in techniques and acquires the material means to
intervene, sometimes in violent ways” (2003, 27–8).
Geuss notably describes his own analysis of the way
that rights talk reinforces some existing uses of power
as Foucauldian (2013, 103), but unlike Geuss, Foucault
maintains that the way institutions invariably overstep
their own legitimizing rules also opens up possibilities
for resistance. If relations of force can be naturalized
and legitimized by the discourse of right, they can also
be undone by turning rights talk against itself for lib-
eratory ends; as he says in the context of gay rights,
for example, “[r]ather than arguing that rights are fun-
damental and natural to the individual, we should try
to imagine and create a new relational right that per-
mits all possible types of relations to exist and not
be prevented, blocked, or annulled by impoverished
relational institutions” (1997, 158). Against Williams’s
and Moyn’s suggestion that human rights be stripped
of their utopian aspirations and Geuss’s view that they
be avoided entirely, Foucault suggests that imagining
and claiming new rights can facilitate better political
action. The impracticability of a global revolt to pre-
vent human rights violations doesn’t legitimate state
intervention in its place; instead, this vision lends sup-
port to existing social movements assisting refugees
while simultaneously drawing our attention to how a
radically different world is required for people to gen-
uinely enjoy their human rights. Such utopian thinking
does not require us to detach ourselves from the world
we actually live in, as Geuss feared, but instead takes
seriously existing practices that can point to ideals be-
yond it.
While, in the abstract, to claim a right may be a way
of asserting something inviolable, in practice, weaker
parties claiming or asserting rights againstmore power-
ful parties are doing something quite different. Rights
demands can also be assertions, seizures, and even per-
formances of the very rights being demanded (Ingram
2013), as Malcolm X’s use of human rights shows. Hu-
man rights were at the center of his political thinking
following his departure from the Nation of Islam in
1964 and, prior to his assassination in 1965, he toured
Africa and Europe for months to promote his plan
to petition the United Nations to protest the U.S.’s
violation of African-Americans’ human rights (Harris
2008; Temkin 2012). He explained the value of human
rights as an orientation to politics when he claimed that
“[t]he difference between the thinking and the scope
of the Negroes who are involved in the human-rights
struggle and those who are involved in the civil-rights
struggle is that those so-called Negroes involved in the
human-rights struggle don’t look upon themselves as
Americans. They look upon themselves as a part of
dark mankind” (1990, 51–2; see also 34–6). In distin-
guishing human rights from civil rights, Malcolm X
recognizes that some rights claims can play the paci-
fying and status-quo-preserving role that the realists
identify. But far from asserting an a priori universality,
he used human rights claims specifically to polarize and
assert difference, constructing a new political identity
by refusing identification with the state and drawing
attention to its repressive power.
Rather than assuming that everyone has the same re-
lation to human rights, MalcolmX argues that African-
Americans have a particular political aim in claiming
them: to undermine state power by appealing beyond
it, to “dark mankind.” He came to see human rights
as the most effective political vehicle for an avowedly
utopian Pan-Africanism, a desirable and impractica-
ble form of unity among people of African descent
throughout the world (Smith 1991). As with Foucault,
the political efficacy of Malcolm X’s vision does not
depend on the possibility of realizing it. Regardless of
whether “dark mankind” will ever exist as a unitary
political force, the vision of it can nevertheless pow-
erfully shape the self-understanding of political actors
and facilitate new possibilities of action. In his view,
civil rights advocates are ineffective because their iden-
tification with American citizenship has oriented them
away from recognizing the way that white supremacy
exercises power through institutions with which they
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identify; identificationwith “darkmankind”would bet-
ter orient them to the operation of that power and to
identify their own interests more readily. In his letter
to the heads of state of the countries belonging to the
Organization of African Unity, he likewise argues that
a human rights framework would better orient them
to the role of white supremacy in global politics and
dispose them to an alliance with African-Americans:
“You will never be fully respected until and unless we
are also respected . . . . Our problem is your problem.
It is not a Negro problem, nor an American problem.
This is a world problem; a problem for humanity. It is
not a problem of civil rights but a problem of human
rights” (1990, 75). Where Geuss sees human rights as
weakening social movements by orienting its adher-
ents to individual victims, Malcolm X’s act of claiming
human rights is itself an assertion of collective politi-
cal power and agency that makes it possible to track
power and perceive political possibilities—in this case,
for transnational solidarity—that might otherwise be
overlooked.
The realists acknowledge that we do not know the
limits of what is possible in politics. Geuss says that of-
fering responsible answers to political questions means
“thinking about them in a space organized around pos-
sible alternatives to the present existing state of affairs”
(2005b, 39) and Williams affirms that “we should ex-
Q7 plore what more radical and ambitious forms of partic-
ipatory or deliberative democracy are possible” (2005,
17). Yet exploring the space of possible alternatives re-
quires utopian thinking that can help us to see new pos-
sibilities in the present, even if the worlds they describe
are impracticable. Foucault’s “international citizenry”
may not literally rise against every abuse of power in-
ternationally, but his invocation of such a world illumi-
nates opportunities for direct action; Malcolm X’s use
of human rights to orient African-Americans towards
identifyingwith “darkmankind” rather thanAmerican
citizenship similarly points political action down new
paths for transnational solidarity. The end of the Cold
War has only amplified the importance of nonstate ac-
tors in world politics and these oppositional utopias
offer a model of how effective orientations to such a
complex world might be imagined.
Realism stands against the belief that we can have
it all and, to combat that kind of wishful thinking,
foregrounds the idea that a responsible politics en-
tails accepting some loss. Moyn applies this thought
to human rights and suggests that “in the long view,
the search for rights beyond [the state] may have been
at a considerable price: the loss of the inclusive space
of membership that the concrete state, and even em-
pire, had long provided in some form or other” (Moyn
2010, 42). I do not wish to contest Moyn’s historical
judgment, but to suggest that this nostalgia for the
nation-state provides a poor model for orienting us
effectively to whatever liberatory political possibilities
there may be now. It is true that the UDHR does not
provide a blueprint for addressing the economic in-
equality that concerns Moyn and Geuss, but as I have
argued, the primary practical use of utopian thinking
is not its application. Assuming otherwise leads Moyn
to dismiss the use of human rights by Malcolm X and
other African-American radicals as “a minor feature
of a larger anticolonialism” (Moyn 2010, 106) because
their plans were not put into action, but that mistakes
their value. Their uses of human rights model the pos-
sibility of utopian thinking orienting people to politi-
cal interests that more minimal views overlook. If one
aims to orient people to a shared interest in opposing
inequality in the global economy today, it is important
to ask what better accomplishes this: utopian visions of
a world where everyone enjoys periodic holidays with
pay or Moyn’s return to a national framework, which
disposes adherents to see their interests in competition
with other countries? As this suggests, a realist politics
is not exempt from its own insight that every political
choice entails a loss; for a politics that begins with the
way existing institutions operate, it will always seem
dubious for the powerless to oppose the plans of those
in power. If realists want political theory to do its part
in intervening to stop catastrophe, then they would do
well to consider all the tools available to them.
AN EFFECTIVELY UTOPIAN ORIENTATION?
Foucault and Malcolm X illustrate how we can appre-
ciate utopian thinking as a source of orientation to
the present rather than as a blueprint for the future
and so avoid the pervasive dissatisfactions that have
characterized evaluations of utopia’s political efficacy
since the Cold War. In closing, I want to consider an
alternative way of practicing political theory in light
of these oppositional utopians as well as the realist
critique of applying utopian thinking. Where ideal the-
ory as blueprint fixes the future and then proclaims
that we should march towards a predetermined des-
tination, a view of ideal theory as orientation suggests
that a utopia isn’t worth pursuing if it can’t orient us to
the here and now. I develop this view by considering
John Rawls, whom the realists identify as their lead-
ing contemporary opponent. While realists correctly
note that Rawls’s view lacks an adequate conception
of power, they overlook the fact that Rawls specifically
asserted that “[n]either political philosophy nor justice
as fairness . . . is appliedmoral philosophy” (2001a, 14).
Attending to this surprising strand in Rawls’s work not
only reverses a common interpretation of his thought
(as suggested by the fact that Simmons and Pogge take
themselves to be following Rawls), but also provides
a useful framework for extending the force of utopian
thinking in political theory today.
In a 1983 lecture, Rawls said, “Williams is right that
there can be no ethical theory as he describes it, that
is, a philosophical structure which together with some
degree of empirical fact, yields a decision procedure
for moral reasoning . . . Perhaps, though, while it can-
not provide a decision procedure, it can provide some-
thing else” (Forrester 2012, 264). What can it provide?
In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls strikingly
calls orientation one of the primary aims of politi-
cal philosophy. He writes, “the members of any civi-
lized society need a conception that enables them to
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understand themselves as members having a cer-
tain political status—in a democracy, that of equal
citizenship—andhow this status affects their relation to
their social world. This need political philosophy may
try to answer, and this role I call that of orientation”
(2001a, 2–3). Like the realists,Rawls’s account of orien-
tation is contextual rather than a priori and he endorses
the idea that facilitating action requires knowledge of
one’s social world and the way that legitimating ideas
shape political statuses in that world.11 Rawls empha-
sizes orientation as a response to a particular practical
obstacle to political action; in a modern social world
characterized by complex systems of interdependence,
it is impossible formost people to understand fully how
their actions contribute to their society and in turn rely
on the contributions of others. In order to be appropri-
ately responsive to others in this context, individuals
need to understand themselves as playing a particular
role. But equal citizenship is only one orienting role.
One of the tasks of utopian thinking today is to propose
more such roles to guide political action that involves
those who are not officially co-citizens, as Foucault and
MalcolmXattemptedwith their respective invocations
of “international citizenry” and “dark mankind.”
Of course, even people in actually existing democra-
cies do not enjoy genuinely equal citizenship.How then
could Rawls’s utopian invocation of genuinely equal
citizenship orient us effectively to an unjust present?
Geuss andWilliams acknowledge that society is always
a mixture of cooperation and conflict, but take it as a
given that a responsible orientation must direct politi-
cal actors to attend to the pervasiveness of conflict and
thus the fragility of order. Rawls proposes an alterna-
tive orientation to these same facts. The most effective
means of managing conflict may not be to insist on
its centrality or inevitability. According to Rawls, we
are much more likely to maintain a social order when
we orient ourselves to other members of society as
individuals with equal status with whomwe share some
interests (e.g., maintaining order) even as we conflict in
other areas.His view is thatwemay avoid repeating our
violent history if we habitually attend to the benefits
from being in society and interpret society as a cooper-
ative project with others as equal partners. This doesn’t
mean Rawls is so naı¨ve as to think that all Americans
currently enjoy truly equal political status (2001a, 136–
40). Neither does such a suggestion presuppose an end
to conflict (Rawls 1996, xviii–xix and 54–8). Instead
we might interpret Rawls along the lines suggested
by Williams’s distinction between politics and domi-
nation (Jubb 2015); attending to the way that political
disagreements presuppose the renunciation of domi-
nation may make such disagreements more amenable
to resolution.
By orienting ourselves to those institutions and prac-
tices where values are partially and imperfectly instan-
tiated in the world, we are better able to act in ways
that promote the fuller realization of those values. For
11 Here I differ from Gledhill (2012), who also argues that realist
criticisms of Rawls misfire but does so by defending the practicality
of acting as though we are already in a kingdom of ends.
Rawls as for the realists, a political theory fails when it
tends to produce actions with effects that are contrary
to the values that the theory promotes. In that sense,
the normativity is immanent to the orientation rather
than directing it from outside. If being oriented by
Rawls’s utopian vision does not dispose its adherents
to actions that promote equality in our society, then it
will have failed by its own lights. And Rawls’s vision
should be faulted on these terms. While the realists
misunderstand the nature of their dispute with Rawls,
they are right that he fails to develop a language to
talk about power that would make it possible to orient
one’s actions to it (PRP, 90). Rawls’s own ideal theory
avoids offering an a priori interpretation of institutions
as Kant does, but is nevertheless left profoundly one-
sided; it provides a way to see the value in existing
institutions without a means to analyze their problems.
But attending to power can change our fundamental
interpretation of existing institutions. As Malcolm X
suggested, deciding whether or not American insti-
tutions even partially instantiate the value of equal-
ity rather than using it as ideological cover for white
supremacy requires judgments about both empirical
and normative matters. Through the idea of ideal the-
ory as orientation, Rawls illuminates what effective
utopian thinking can be today, though his own theory
falls regrettably short.
If the search for replacement utopias that began 25
years ago is ever to come to an end, it will not be
because the right blueprints are finally discovered nor
because people decide to put aside their utopian hopes
entirely. To end this prolonged impasse in which utopia
seems both necessary and impossible, we need to
change what we are searching for. Geuss and Williams
showus that political theory should not offer a plan, but
an orientation; however, they unduly constrain the pol-
itics of their intervention by suggesting that utopia has
no appropriate role to play as a source of orientation. I
have argued that utopian thinking can and should aim
at developing orientations that both facilitate a realistic
power analysis of existing institutions and attend to the
utopian paths made possible by those institutions’ par-
tial and deeply imperfect instantiations of values like
equal, freedom, and human rights. If political thinking
and political action are to be productively linked, both
realism and utopia are essential today.
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